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ESSAY




One of the principal issues in any discussion of legal method is the
amount of discretion enjoyed by trial and appellate judges. There has
been, however, anything but unified agreement on the factors that lead
judges to make particular decisions. The older mechanical, or "slot-
machine," theory of judicial decision-making was put most effectively
by Justice Roberts in 1936:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the
courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the
judicial branch of the Government has only one duty,-to lay
the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the
statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter
squares with the former.'
Essentially, Roberts argued that judges discover the law either in the
timeless principles of the common law or in statutes and the Constitu-
tion, and that a judge has no choice but to apply mechanically the su-
perior norm. The rules of deductive logic guide the judge in applying
the law once the correct premises are discovered.
But during the same decades that the mechanical view of the
judge's role flourished,' there were contrary and disturbing indications
that this explanation was far too simple. For example, Cardozo pub-
* Trial Attorney, Antitrust Division, Justice Department, Washington, D.C. A.B., Univer-
sity of California (Riverside), 1966; M.A., University of California (Santa Barbara), 1967, Ph.D.,
1970; J.D., Capital University, 1977. The views expressed herein represent those of the author and
not the Department of Justice.
I. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). See generally 0. ROBERTS, THE COURT
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1951).
2. See note 11 infra and accompanying text.
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lished several influential volumes during the 1920's which afforded a
rare insight into the nature of judicial decision-making.3 His theory
varied greatly with the view of Roberts. Cardozo was particularly ef-
fective in detailing the multiple pathways (logic, history, custom, and
social welfare) by which an appellate judge could decide an important
case. More significantly, beginning in the early 1930's, legal realism
began to take hold in some leading American law schools.4 This theory
provided a vital new way of looking at law and judicial policymaking.
The realists, though divergent in orientation and methods, were unified
in seeking to strip away the symbolism and self-serving declarations of
judges and to focus instead upon the "real" factors leading judges to
decide cases as they did. One of the principal leaders of this movement
was Karl Llewellyn, who for thirty years was to investigate and to write
about the actual functioning processes of judicial policymaking. Llew-
ellyn dismissed the legal rules as "paper rules." Instead he maintained
that such factors as judicial values and the evolution of law as it keeps
pace with social change are more integral issues in understanding the
legal process. In 1960, however, Llewellyn modified his original em-
phasis upon the freedom of action enjoyed by appellate judges. In his
epic work, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals,5 Llewellyn
laid out a number of "steadying factors" which he believed restrict the
possible range of judicial discretion.
Legal realism as a movement had sharply declined in importance
by the early 1950's.6 A parallel investigation of the legal system by
political scientists-the study of judicial behavior-proved to be more
significant and continues to flourish.7 Using the insights and method-
ological tools of social science, the judicial behavior specialists took up
and broadened the realists' investigation of the legal system. While
they made greater use of statistical methods of analysis and of social
science concepts, such as role theory and small group decision-making,
their research substantiates the early proposals of the realists.' It has
been suggested that the two movements are but separate stages in the
3. B. CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); B. CARDOZO, THE
GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924). For a splendid collection of Cardozo's writings, see B. CARDOZO,
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO (M. Hall ed. 1947).
4. For a comprehensive discussion of the legal realists, complete with effective bibliography,
see W. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968).
5. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960) [hereinafter
cited as LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION].
6. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Ulmer, The Anavsis of Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme Court,
22 J. POL. 629 (1960); Ulmer, Supreme Court Behavior and CivilRights, 13 W. POL. Q. 288 (1960).
8. See generally the authorities cited in note 45 infra.
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same process of legal analysis, with the realists (and Llewellyn in par-
ticular) having blazed the trail which was later followed by the judicial
behavioralists. 9 This paper seeks to reverse this process and to use the
findings of the judicial behavior research to investigate and to substan-
tiate or to reject some of the earlier realism theories, particularly the
"steadying factors" suggested by Llewellyn. The result will be not only
to evaluate the realist perspective as set out by Llewellyn, but also to
demonstrate to the reader some of the insights pertaining to legal
method that the two movements have uncovered.
II. LEGAL REALISM
Any extensive discussion of the legal realists and their varied per-
spectives is beyond the scope of this essay.10 It is appropriate, however,
to discuss briefly the general outlines of the legal realism perspective,
and in particular to indicate Llewellyn's position within the movement.
Legal realism was anticipated by several previous jurisprudential
developments. First in importance was the early work of Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Jr. Until challenged by Holmes, the primary American
view of law had been drawn from Blackstone. According to Black-
stone, law is a body of self-contained principles, true by virtue of their
agreement with reason, and the answer to any legal problem rests in the
correct logical deduction from this body of first principles.I' Law does
not vary to match social evolution, and it is not really concerned with
bringing about social change. The key goal is to maintain a logical
nexus with the sacred body of principles that constitutes the common
law. Statutory changes in or augmentations of the body of common
law principles are to be resisted. Common law principles are timeless
and can meet any emerging social problem, however novel. Holmes
reacted against this position of "sterile logicism ' ' 2 in his essay, The
Path of the Law, published in 1897.13 Similar views were expressed in
his significant work, The Common Law:
9. Ingersoll, Karl Llewellyn, 4merican Legal Realism, and Contemporary Legal Behavioral-
ism, 75 ETHICS 253 (1966).
10. Furthermore, the available literature on the movement is sufficiently abundant to obviate
the need for any extended analysis. See note 4 supra.
11. For an excellent analysis of Blackstone's philosophy, see D. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS
SCIENCE OF THE LAW (1941). For American applications of Blackstone's thought, see P. MILLER,
THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 156-71 (1965).
12. This term is drawn from Aronson, Tendencies in American Jurisprudence, 4 U. TORONTO
L.J. 90, 94 (1941).
13. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L.J. 457 (1897).
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The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and politi-
cal theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or uncon-
scious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
fellowmen, have had a good deal more to do than the syllo-
gism in determining the rules by which men should be gov-
erned. The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it
contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathe-
matics. In order to know what is, we must know what it has
been, and what it tends to become. 14
Holmes believed that legal study should focus on the sources of legal
rules, the historical antecedents of the rules, and changing social reali-
ties which may require the alignment of legal rules and social con-
duct. 5 Similar attacks on legal logic were later made in the writings of
John Dewey, who saw logic not as "a deduction of certainties from
theoretical or apriori principles but a prediction of probabilities."' 6
A second vital precursor to legal realism was the sociological juris-
prudence movement pioneered by Roscoe Pound. Pound's approach to
law was founded on the pragmatic belief that good law satisfies social
need. 7 He believed that the common law had become in part defec-
tive, because it had stressed in an uncompromising fashion individual
rights at the expense of social interests.' 8 For Pound, law is a tool for
social engineering, 9 to assist in the realization of social need. Law is
not something to be studied in books or from the standpoint of logical
purity; rather, the proper subject of legal study should be the actual
impact of law upon society.20 As a consequence, courts should not be
limited by logical rules of deduction. Judges should take a broader
perspective of social and economic circumstances, which would pro-
vide a practical orientation based upon knowledge of economics, soci-
ology, and politics. Law is a means to a greater end; law is not the end.
The rules which comprise the common law are based on a past society
14. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (1963).
15. See Paul, Foundations ofAmerican Realism, 60 W. VIA. L.R. 37, 38-40 (1957).
16. Burrus, American LegalRealism, 8 How. L.J. 36, 39 (1962). See Dewey, Logical Method
andLaw, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 26-27 (1910).
17. E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 110-12 (1974). On Pound, seegenerall, D. WIGDOR,
ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW (1974).
18. This theme is probably best demonstrated in R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON
LAW (1963).
19. W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 336-37 (5th ed. 1967).
20. Savarese, American Legal Realism, 3 Hous. L.R. 180, 184 (1965).
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with different needs. New conceptions of property, contract, and indi-
vidual rights are necessary, and the law has to adjust to these new de-
mands. A considerable amount of overhauling of legal theory was in
order, for only by bringing law into balance with social needs could law
serve its proper functions.
Against this background, the legal realism movement began to de-
velop in the 1930's.1 It is certainly incorrect to suggest that there was a
single legal realism movement. In actuality, the movement was made
up of individuals who shared some common viewpoints toward law,
but who maintained highly individualistic perspectives as well.22 There
was no set orthodoxy around which the realists tended to congregate,
other than a desire to study empirically the actual operation of the law.
Two principal branches of the movement emerged, one led by Jerome
Frank and the other by Karl Llewellyn. In fact, Frank recognized this
division in the 1948 preface to his monumental Law and the Modern
Mind23 in which he classified Llewellyn's perspective as that of the
"rule skeptic." 24 The rule skeptics branch of realism focused upon the
appellate courts and the role that legal rules play in limiting their dis-
cretion in decision-making. Drawing from Pound's emphasis upon law
in action, as well as from the attacks of Holmes and Dewey upon legal
logic, the rule skeptics were doubtful that case law precedent had any
restraining effect on the judges. They pointed to such factors as the
multiplicity of precedents, the various accepted techniques for manipu-
lating precedents, the inability of logic to indicate which of a number of
competing premises ought to be selected, the ambiguity of legal lan-
guage, and the role of psychological influences (which one realist judge
termed "hunches"25) in making decisions.26 Llewellyn suggested that
in reality legal rules were frequently nothing more than "paper" rules
which often suggested what ought to be, rather than being the actual
result of judicial decisions.27 Facts, as manifested in what judges actu-
ally did, were the vital focus of legal study, and not abstract rules which
supposedly dictated a particular result. As a consequence, law was an
21. See note 4 supra.
22. K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 53 (1962) [hereinafter cited as LLEWELLYN, JURISPRU-
DENCE]. Llewellyn recognizes some of the common perspectives shared by the bulk of the realists
to be discussed in this article. Id. at 55-60.
23. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1963).
24. Id. at xi.
25. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14
CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
26. W. RUMBLE, JR., supra note 4, at 50-78.
27. See LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 22-25.
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empirical rather than a normative science.2" In short, wrote Llewellyn,
"there is less possibility of accurate prediction of what courts will do
than the traditional rules would lead us to suppose."2 9 Therefore, the
rule skeptics-while certainly not dismissing the role of rules in all situ-
ations-felt that judges are free to choose between conflicting prece-
dential premises. Judicial decisions, no matter how fully clothed in
logic and abstract rules, do not candidly explain why one particular
premise had been chosen over others. As a result, law is what officials
do, not what they say, and this should be the orientation of legal study.
The second faction of the realist movement will be mentioned only
briefly here, because its full development is tangential to this article.
The "fact skeptics," led by Frank, focused upon trial rather than appel-
late courts. Their criticisms were far more devastating than simply sug-
gesting that legal rules did not always dictate the outcome of a case.
Frank's thesis was that the courts cannot even make accurate findings
of fact, let alone apply the correct rules to those facts.30 He believed
that "the certainty of law is an illusion, a fictitious, unconscious pre-
tense to satisfy the infantile craving of the public for security."'31 Frank
argued that the frailties of human memory and language, coupled with
the subconscious desires of witnesses, jurors, and judges, combine to
produce a situation where facts are seldom accurately ascertained by
the trial process. These problems were further accentuated by the ad-
versary or "fight theory" of trial procedure. When the goal is to win,
relevant facts may be kept out of the trial completely. 2 Hence, even if
rules are the motivating force in judicial decision-making, there still is
little possibility for having a truly rule-oriented system of law. Further-
more, the judges' own subconscious psychological desires and intu-
itions are far more influential in making decisions than is any body of
rules.33
The rule skeptics were met with a flood of strong criticism in re-
sponse to their theories of judicial decision-making. Expected adverse
comment emanated from those who felt that legal rules and logic are
28. See Moskowitz, The American Legal Realists and an Empirical Science of Law, I 1 VILL.
L.R. 480, 498-501 (1966).
29. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 60.
30. See generally J. ROSENBERG, JEROME FRANK: JURIST AND PHILOSOPHER (1970).
31. Yntema, American Legal Realism in Retrospect, 14 VAND. L.R. 317, 321 (1960).
32. See generally J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
(1949).
33. Purcell, American Jurisprudence between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Deno-
cratic Theory, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 424, 431-32 (1969).
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far more influential in decision-making, if not determinative, than the
realists were willing to admit.3" Another major source of criticism,
however, was somewhat surprising. Roscoe Pound published an influ-
ential attack upon the realists in 1931.11 He criticized the realists for
their extreme underemphasis of the role of rules, 36 and for their reli-
ance upon statistical documentation of what the courts actually do.
37
Pound's most basic point was that the realists, by concentrating exclu-
sively upon what the courts do in fact, have ignored the vital issue of
what the courts ought to do.38 Pound and the sociological jurispru-
dence movement had been deeply concerned with realizing social jus-
tice through the use of law. The rule skeptics appeared to Pound to
throw over all normative issues and to focus only upon the empirical
analysis of what judges in fact do. Llewellyn responded by asserting
that this division of the "is" from the "ought" was only tempo-
rary-that to make any reforms in the legal system it is necessary to
demonstrate empirically what the system is actually doing.39
A third criticism, levied by Lon Fuller, attacked the realists for
their easy rejection of legal rules and fervent adoption of behavioral-
ism.4° For Fuller, realism's rejection of universals and abstractions
tended to discount the role that concepts play in legal reasoning. Fuller
was supported by Kantorowicz, who argued that a certain degree of
discretion is inherent in any legal rule or concept and that the realists,
by over-emphasizing the amount of that discretion, had merely set up a
34. See, e.g., M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 165 (1967); J. DICKINSON, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 128-40 (1959); Cohen,
The Place ofLogic in the Law, 29 HARV. L.R. 622 (1915); Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function
in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L.R. 833 (1931). One could also, of course, point to the "pure
theory of law" as manifesting the viewpoint that legal rules alone can serve as an effective device
with which to study the legal system. See Kelsen, The Pure Theory ofLaw (pt. 1), 50 LAW Q. RE.
474 (1934) and (pt. 2) 53 LAW. Q. REV. 517 (1935). See also W. EBENSTEIN, THE PURE THEORY
OF LAW (1945). For an effective position asserting the opposing viewpoint, see Stoijar, The Logi-
cal Status ofa LegalPrincple, 20 U. CHI. L.R. 181 (1953). It was recently asserted that some new
developments in analytical positivism have led to a rapprochement with legal realism. See
Bodenheimer, Analytical Positivism, Legal Realism, and the Future of Legal Method, 44 VA. L.R.
365 (1958).
35. Pound, The Call/or a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L.R. 697 (1931).
36. Id. at 705-07.
37. Id. at 701-02.
38. Id. at 700.
39. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 22, at 55-56. For further rebuttal of Pound's
position, see Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective ofLegal Realism, 61 COLUM. L.R. 799
(1961).
40. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L.R. 429, 445-47 (1934). Fuller's attack is by
no means limited to this point. See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 52-64 (1966).
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straw man to knock down.4 ' Irrespective of these criticisms, the realists
did have an impact upon legal thought. Grant Gilmore has suggested
that the legal activity which has produced the Restatements, the Ameri-
can Law Institute, and various movements toward codification, indi-
cates the significance of the realist perspective.4 z
That legal realism had a significant impact on legal theory is be-
yond question. By the middle 1950's, Llewellyn had reached the con-
clusion that the public in general, and the bar in particular, had
become so skeptical of judicial decision-making that they had ignored
totally the restraining role that rules do play. A genuine "crisis of con-
fidence" faced the appellate courts, and Llewellyn decided to write a
book explaining the elements which he felt limit appellate judicial dis-
cretion. This significant volume, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding
Appeals, published in 1960, was devoted to a study of these restraining
influences. Llewellyn identified fourteen "steadying factors" which he
saw as limiting the free scope of judicial discretion.43 In addition, he
supplemented his thesis by extensive case studies of different appellate
courts' policymaking periods. While the book does not stress social sci-
ence methods, and while a social scientist might question the accuracy
of the sampling technique employed by Llewellyn, he does refer to con-
cepts familiar to today's social scientists. This paper, after an introduc-
tion to the orientation and techniques of judicial behavior studies, will
discuss the validity of these asserted "steadying factors" as they have
been subsequently investigated in the political science literature. While
not all of Llewellyn's theses will be investigated, the paper will focus
upon four or five of his most suggestive and significant theses. It
should also be emphasized that Llewellyn did not abandon his realist
perspective, but he sought to present a more complete picture of the
factors influencing judicial decision-making by discussing the re-
straining factors that he believed play an important role in that deci-
sion-making. 4
III. THE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR MOVEMENT
The focus of political science has shifted from institutional to indi-
41. Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240, 1244-45 (1934). On
this issue of the role of discretion in law, see generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
42. Gilmore, Legal Realism Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961). See also G.
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 58-59 (1974).
43. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 5, at 19.
44. See L. LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 409-13 (3d ed. 1972).
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vidual behavior.45 Paralleling this movement, attention has been given,
within the public law sub-category, to the judicial process-the meth-
ods of judicial decision-making-rather than simply to the analysis of
the product of that process, case decisions. Frankly recognizing that
judges are makers of public policy, recent research has taken tentative
steps toward the creation of a framework of analysis that explains both
what decisions have been made and how such decisions result from a
judicial policy process. Research studies have examined a wide range
of relevant variables and have related them to the final decisions. Such
factors as where judges come from, how their backgrounds influence
their judicial behavior, the role of the judicial environment in affecting
behavior, strategies of intra- and extra-court influence, and the rela-
tionship of the courts to other policymaking institutions have all come
under examination.46
More precisely, recent judicial process research has attempted to
achieve certain basic goals. Theodore L. Becker has concisely defined
these objectives as (1) precise, quantitative descr~ition; (2) social scien-
tific explanation of political behavior; and (3) reasonably precise, quan-
titativepredictions of political behavior.47 Or, as Glendon Schubert has
suggested, "Judicial behavioralism is an attempt to construct a system-
atic theory about human behavior, analyzing data about judges and
adjudicatory processes of decision-making by using theories and meth-
ods from all the behavioral sciences, according to their relevance to the
particular inquiry at hand. '48 Of the goals indicated, explanation is the
most cherished and valuable. Unfortunately, it is also the most difficult
to attain.
The scholarly attempt to relate certain background characteristics
of judges to their decision-making patterns has been one of the first and
most widely employed methods of studying the judicial process. The
focusing upon factors other than logical deduction immediately indi-
cates the close kinship of the study of judicial behavior with legal real-
45. The judicial behavior movement is traced in Pritchett, Public Law and Judicial Behavior,
30 J. POL. 480 (1968); Rigby & Witt, Bibliographic Essay. Behavioral Research in Public Law 1963-
1967, 22 W. POL. Q. 622 (1969); Schubert, Bibliographic Essay: Behavioral Research in Public
Law, 57 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 433 (1963); Shapiro, Political Jurisprudence, 52 KENTUCKY L.J. 294
(1964).
46. See generally authorities cited in note 45 supra.
47. Becker, Inquiry into a School of Thought in the Judicial Behavior Movement, 7 MIDWEST J.
POL. Sc. 254, 256 (1963). The research techniques developed to achieve these goals include bloc
analysis, role theory, jurimetrics, small-group theory, attitudinal scaling, systems analysis, and
social background analysis. These will be examined more fully below.
48. Schubert, Ideologies and Attitudes, Academic and Judicial, 29 J. POL. 3, 7 (1967).
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ism. One early attempt to use this method was Charles Groves Haines'
pioneering study.4 9 In seeking to strike a reasonable mean between ad-
vocates of "slot-machine" jurisprudence and those favoring the "free
legal decision" viewpoint, Haines concisely stated what this type of
study seeks to establish:
Just as is the case with other opinions of individuals, judicial
opinions necessarily represent in a measure the personal im-
pulses of the judge, in relation to the situation before him, and
these impulses are determined by the judge's lifelong series of
previous experiences."
Basically, background studies attempt to identify and then to relate
such factors as personality, education, family and personal associations,
political affiliations, and judicial temperament to judges and their pat-
terns of decision-making. Unfortunately, a warning provided by
Haines is often overlooked: "The influences which move men even to
do simple acts are too subtle to be summed up in such a catchword as
'economic bias.' "151
Haines was content to cite a few 1916 statistics on the sentencing
behavior of New York magistrates to indicate that variation can result
because judging is "a personal thing." More recent studies have uti-
lized sophisticated statistical devices. Two articles by Stuart Nagel
demonstrate this technique. In the first,52 Nagel was able to establish a
statistically significant relationship between party membership and ju-
dicial votes in criminal cases during 1955 on the New Jersey and Penn-
sylvania Supreme Courts. Briefly, Nagel demonstrated that Democrats
were above their courts' averages in deciding in favor of defendants on
appeal, while Republicans were below their courts' averages. In the
second article,53 similar techniques were used to relate party member-
ship to fifteen types of legal issues in a sample of 298 state and federal
supreme court judges. Once again, in nine categories Nagel demon-
strated a statistically significant relationship between party membership
and voting. The Democrats were generally above their courts' averages
in proliberal decisions (ie., favoring lower classes and social change),
while the Republicans were below the average. Nagel is cautious in his
49. Haines, General Observations of the Effects of Personal, Political and Economic Influences
in the Decision of Judges, 17 ILL. L.R. 96 (1922).
50. Id. at 104-05.
51. Id. at 116.
52. Nagel, Testing Relations Between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision.Making,
15 W. POL. Q. 425 (1962).
53. Nagel, Political Party Affliation and Judge's Decisions, 55 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 843 (1961).
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interpretation of these findings, saying only that party affiliation and
the nature of decisions both stem from the same background factors.
But he does indicate a well-founded belief that such a technique can be
used to test broad propositions relating to the interaction between
background factors and judicial decisions.
Similar fundamental techniques have been used by John
Schmidhauser. In a study54 covering the Supreme Court from 1790
through 1957, Schmidhauser related adherence to precedent, overrul-
ing of precedent, and dissents from majority opinions, to such factors
as party affiliation, regional background, and prior judicial experience.
Using case evaluation techniques similar to those used by Nagel,
Schmidhauser demonstrated that certain combinations of background
factors were present for upholders of precedent, for overrulers, and for
dissenters. In a second study,55 covering the Supreme Court from 1837
through 1860, Schmidhauser suggested that party affiliation, rather
than regional background, was a factor in judicial behavior on the Ta-
ney Court in relation to slavery and business decisions.
To prove that two facts are present in certain situations is not to
prove that one factor causes the other. Indeed, the cautious caveats of
Nagel and Schmidhauser emphasize this point. Joel Grossman eyed
this technique critically,5 6 and his observations are both relevant and
interesting. One of his basic concerns is that these studies tacitly as-
sume that factor A causes result B, without being concerned with the
possible influences of other factors in this "conversion" process. Sec-
ond, such studies ignore judicial consensus by gathering as raw data
only nonunanimous opinions. Since most judges on most courts agree
far more than they disagree, institutional influence is too significant to
be disregarded. Third, Grossman doubts whether clearcut value
choices are frequently available to judges. He believes that it is more
likely that they have a series of marginal choices. Because each back-
ground factor is presumed to have equal effect on each judge in each
judicial decision and because each judge is studied in isolation, the
real-life situation in which judicial decision-making takes place can be
distorted.
54. Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Background ofthe Justices of the Supreme
Court ofthe United States, 14 U. TORONTO L.R. 194 (1962).
55. Schmidhauser, Judicial Behavior and the Sectional Crisis, 1837-1860, in CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW IN THE POLrricAL PROCESS 486 (1963).
56. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions: Notesfor a Theory, 29 J. POL. 334
(1967); Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making, 79 HARv. L.R. 1551 (1966).
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IV. LLEWELLYN'S STEADYING FACTORS
A. Professional Judicial Office
The most important steadying factor, Llewellyn suggests, is what
he terms "professional judicial office."57 By this he means that the in-
dividual who occupies a judicial office will have a certain normative
model against which to measure his own behavior. Such factors as im-
partiality, uprightness, fairness, and susceptibility to reasoned argu-
ment are components of the judge's role. As a result, the individual
judge seeks to comply with a model of how a judge ought to decide,
even if this involves a diminishing of what his own values tell him he
should decide. As Llewellyn puts it, "The office waits and then moves
with majestic power to shape the man." 8 Therefore, role theory can
explain how judges are in fact restrained by their own conception of
judicial office, a far more significant restraint than precedent or logic.
In the wake of the important work being done in the legislative
process involving the concept of role theory, it was probably inevitable
that such a research technique would be utilized to study the judicial
process. Kenneth Vines has defined role as a "description of the nor-
mative expectations concerning the proper behavior and personal qual-
ities of a specific social or political position."' 9 The normative aspect is
vital to the concept of role;60 behavior which is in accord with such
normative expectations is designated as "role behavior." The role con-
cept is valuable in that it allows evaluation in terms of the institutional
framework within which individual behavior takes place.
Vines has made one tentative exploration into the feasibility of us-
ing role theory in judicial research.61 He suggests that role theory may
be particularly valuable in judicial research since there are many possi-
ble roles which a judge can legitimately play within the formal and
traditional standards of the bench. With this in mind, Vines studied
four state supreme courts for one year. The first part of Vine's study
drew its data from questionnaires submitted to the judges. From this
sample, Vines posited a number of judicial models of role behavior.
For example, some judges saw their role as one of settling disputes,
57. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 5, at 45.
58. Id. at 48.
59. Vines, The Judicial Role in the American States, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH
464 (J. Grossman & J. Tanenhaus ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Vines].
60. J. WAHLKE, H. EULAU, W. BUCHANAN, & R. FERGUSON, THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM:
EXPLORATIONS IN LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR 9 (1962).
61. Vines, supra note 59.
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others suggested one of supervising the lower courts, while still others
envisioned themselves as defenders of the Constitution. Some judges
frankly admitted that they made policy and felt it was necessary to dis-
charging their responsibilities, while others saw their legitimate func-
tion as being narrowly limited to strict interpretation of the law.
In the second part of the study, Vines utilized case analysis to
check the agreement between the role that the judge believes he fulfills
and his actual behavior. Vines used unanimous opinions in this study,
as well as nonunanimous decisions, and found that often members with
the same party identification perceived their roles significantly differ-
ently. His results suggest that the background analysis technique, in
confining its data to nonunanimous opinions only,62 has exaggerated
the degree of intracourt disagreement and has been consequently mis-
led in its findings. Vines concludes that his study has far too little data
for any definitive findings, his purpose being merely to demonstrate the
potential utility of role analysis.
A second example of role theory is found in Joel Grossman's ex-
amination of Justice Frankfurter.63 This work is a reaction to various
studies that were based upon vote counting and that indicated Frank-
furter was unsympathetic to civil liberty claims. Grossman felt that
such a uni-dimensional analysis "ignores this complex of decision-
making factors and concentrates almost exclusively on the result, which
is only a part of the entire decision-making process."' Grossman be-
lieved that role theory can give a more accurate and comprehensive
picture when added to these other findings. To ascertain Frankfurter's
perception of his own role, Grossman extracted propositions from his
opinions which showed Frankfurter's tendency toward judicial re-
straint.65 Grossman concluded that, while Frankfurter undoubtedly
voted on occasion against civil liberty claims based upon his perception
of judicial restraint rather than substantive opposition to such claim-
ants, extraction of those cases shows Frankfurter to be a few steps
closer to the center on such issues. Grossman's point is well made.
62. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
63. Grossman, Role-Playing and the Analysis of Judicial Behavior: The Case ofMr. Justice
Frankfurter, II J. PUB. LAW 285 (1962).
64. Id. at 286.
65. Grossman defines role as "a consistent pattern of behavior on the part of an individual in
response to his conception of the nature of his function in a system." Id. at 294. For other concep-
tions of role, see ROLE THEORY (B. Bidde & E. Thomas eds. 1966); N. GRoss, W. MASON, & A.
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Uni-dimensional scaling (based on vote counting) can be dangerous if
confined to a single-factor type analysis; role theory can offer a valua-
ble tool to complement such techniques.
A Vines-type questionnaire methodology was used by Theodore
Becker in his study of thirty Hawaiian judges. 66 He determined that
certain factors (such as the judge's perception of justice in the case; the
appearance of highly respected counsel; or the judge's belief of what
the public welfare required) influence the role of judicial decision-
maker. Becker was also concerned with the role adherence to prece-
dent played in influencing judicial decisions. In the first part of the
questionnaire, he asked the judges to rank, in order of importance, fac-
tors that influenced their decisions in a case. Next, Becker posited a
hypothetical case and asked for a decision. Thus, like Vine's study of
case decisions,67 Becker sought to compare judicial perception with ac-
tual behavior. His findings indicated that 68% rated subjective factors
such as "common sense" and "what the public demands" as more in-
fluential than adherence to clear precedent. Yet, in deciding the hypo-
thetical case, 78% held precedent to be the single most important factor.
Again, this study is merely a demonstration by Becker of techniques,
and it used only a small sample of data for illustration.
The most extensive use of role theory to explain judicial behavior
is found in Henry Glick's Supreme Courts in State Politics.68 Drawing
his data from a number of state supreme courts, Glick was able to iden-
tify several different roles that judges saw themselves as playing:
lawmaker (policymaker), law interpreter, protector of individual rights,
and administrator of state court systems. The conflict between the role
of lawmaker and that of law interpreter is most important. Some
judges openly expressed their opinion that it was their responsibility to
make policy when the occasion arose. Glick suggests that this view is
more likely in a state manifesting a liberal political orientation, such as
Pennsylvania. In contrast, the law interpreters were more passive and
devoted to implementing narrowly either past precedent or statutory
legislation. A conservative political environment, such as Louisiana,
encouraged this role orientation. The law interpreters rated precedent
as a much more vital factor than did the lawmakers, who instead
ranked social welfare and justice as more vital influences.
66. Becker, A Survey Study ofHawaiian Judges.- The Effect on Decisions of JudicialRole Par!.
aions, 60 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 677 (1966).
67. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
68. H. GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS (1974).
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This recent judicial research affirms Llewellyn's thesis that judicial
role does act as a factor of influence in decision-making. There is even
some indication that role concepts carry over into nonjudicial activities
of judges as well.6 9 Some work has been done using role theory as a
tool of analysis for studying trial judges also.7° It is imperative to note,
however, that role is not always an influence which restrains judges
from innovative decision-making. For the lawmakers, role concept
would encourage the flexibility and discretion that Llewellyn felt had
been overstressed by critics of appellate courts. It is clear, however,
that appellate decision-making is not simply a stimulus (value prefer-
ence)-response (decision) relationship. Another variable, the judge's
own conception of how he ought to decide, intervenes and exercises
some vital influence.
B. Collegial Decision-Making
A second major steadying factor cited by Llewellyn is "group deci-
sion.' Critics often overlook the fact that judges at the appellate level
make their decisions in groups, either in panels of three or groups of
nine at the intermediate appellate level, and by full bench at the
Supreme Court level. As a result, Llewellyn argued, a judge is re-
strained from exercising absolute discretion by having to convince
other judges of the merits of his position. In addition, in writing opin-
ions, judges write for the others in their majority or dissenting bloc.7"
Therefore, an opinion is not simply the rationalization of an individual
judge, but it is rather a joint product. Cooperative brief-writing also
diminishes the discretion available to any single appellate judge.
Having utilized background influence analysis and posited various
types of perceived judicial roles, some students of the judicial process
have turned to the sociological tool of small group theory. As defined
by Eloise C. Synder, small group theory "deals with the Supreme Court
as a small group and attempts to discover what group processes are
present as the justices solve the important problems brought before
them.' 73 It is this process of face-to-face interaction, with the possible
69. Beiser, Goodman, & Cornwell, JudicialRole in a Nonjudicial Setting, 5 L. & Soc'Y REV.
571 (1971).
70. Ungs & Baas, Judicial Role Perceptions: .4 Q-Technique Study of Ohio Judges, 6 L. &
Soc'Y REv. 343 (1972).
71. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 5, at 31.
72. Id. at 26. Though Llewellyn tends to identify opinion-writing as a separate factor, the
author believes that it rightly should be considered as an aspect of collegial decision-making.
73. Synder, The Supreme Court as a Small Group, 36 Soc. FORCES 232 (1958).
1979]
15
Clark: Karl Llewellyn on Legal Method: A Social Science Reconsideration
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
manifestation of cliques, collegial leadership, patterns of influence, bar-
gaining, and tactics of persuasion, that is the focus of this method.74
The existence of persistent patterns of similar voting behavior among
Court members is at least a tentative indication that small group, inter-
personal processes are at work.
A pioneering study using this technique was done by Eloise
Synder in 1958." 5 The goal of her work, which covered the Supreme
Court during the period of 1921-1953, was to determine whether sub-
groups or cliques were evident from analysis of case opinions. Synder
reported patterns of agreement and disagreement among Court mem-
bers over a long period, although agreement was much more frequent.
She found three blocs: a liberal (e.g., 1943-1945: Black, Douglas, Rut-
ledge, Murphy), a conservative (e.g., 1930-1932: Butler, Van Devanter,
Sutherland, McReynolds), and a moderate-pivotal (e.g., 1943-1945:
Stone, Reed). Although the membership changed due to attrition,
these blocs persisted. Some change did take place, but with the excep-
tions Frankfurter and Jackson that modification was limited to shifts
from either the liberal or the conservative to the pivotal bloc. These
moves were seldom completely to the opposite pole on the continuum.
Synder believed that these shifts, mostly from liberal to pivotal, were a
result of changing "conceptual frameworks" due to new Court person-
nel. When newer radical ideas came to the Court, the older liberals,
holding to their tenents, were in effect moved toward the conservative
pole. The late Justice Black may have been a current example of this
phenomenon.
Small group analysis must be accepted carefully. As Walter Mur-
phy has indicated:
Since Pritchett and Synder only used voting records they
could discover little more than that Justices could be classi-
fied; study of groups also requires consideration of interper-
sonal interaction and influence. The fact that two or more
Justices vote together is rather weak evidence that their votes
are the result of interaction; standing alone, voting records tell
very little about the force or direction of any interpersonal
influence that may exist. Small group analysis requires other
74. See C. PRITCHETr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1969); C. PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
THE VINSON COURT (1954). This particular methodological development grew, in part, out of the
early efforts of Pritchett and others to demonstrate the persistence of blocs on the Court through
vote analysis.
75. Synder, supra note 73.
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kinds of data and a more general understanding of the impact
of a group decision situation on individual behavior.76
Since the judiciary is fairly well removed from direct scholarly observa-
tion, such innermost penetration presents great difficulties. Neverthe-
less, several more sophisticated studies-based upon papers of Justices,
law clerks' observations, and perhaps even some rumors-have been
forthcoming.
One prime example is provided by David Danelski, who evaluated
group leadership from the perspective of the task leader and of the so-
cial leader in his study of the Chief Justices during conference.77 A
task leader leads the group to make decisions; the social leader works to
maintain social cohesion within the group. Drawing his data primarily
from papers of the Justices, Danelski posits four basic situations that
can develop. A Chief Justice can be both social and task leader
(Hughes), social but not task leader (Taft), task but not social leader
(no example given), or neither social nor task leader (Stone).78 The
ideal situation is the firm leadership of Hughes, which produced low
intra-group conflict, high social cohesion, satisfaction with conference,
and high productivity. The worst situation resulted from lack of any
leadership (Stone) which produced unrestrained bickering and reduced
cohesion, satisfaction, and productivity.
The Chief Justice may also influence his group through opinion
assignment and maximization of group unity. In assigning opinions,
Danelski suggests two possible strategies which the Chief Justice may
follow:
Rule 1: Assign the case to the justice whose views are the
closest to the dissenters on the ground that his opinion would
take a middle approach upon which both majority and minor-
ity could agree.
Rule 2: Where there are blocs on the Court and a bloc splits,
assign the opinion to a majority member of the dissenters'
bloc on the grounds that (a) he would take a middle approach
upon which both majority and minority could agree and (b)
the minority justices would be more likely to agree with him
because of general mutuality of agreement.79
76. Murphy, Courts as Small Groups, 79 HARv. L.R. 1565-67 (1966).
77. DANELSKI, The Influence of the Chief ustice in the Decisional Process, in C. PRITCHETT &
D. DANELSKI, COURTS AND JUDGES 497-508 (1961).
78. For a full discussion of these firm leadership techniques, see McElwain, The Business of
the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes, 63 HARV. L.R. 5-26 (1949).
79. Danelski, supra note 77, at 504.
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In uniting the Court, the Chief Justice tries to limit dissent and to pro-
mote intra-group compromise. This spirit of moderation and compro-
mise eases tense arguments and allows overall agreement and
productivity to rise.
Moving the focus away from the Chief Justice, Walter Murphy,
again working from private papers, has contributed a most fascinating
article on how Justices may seek to influence each other through the
use of social skills.10 The study indicates some of the methods by
which a Justice can mass support behind his position on controversial
issues. Murphy cautions the reader, however, that the Court is a partic-
ular type of group: it works within a well-defined and peculiar tradi-
tion, and its members must look forward to a long period of future
cooperation. The Chief Justice is expected to lead, and he can conse-
quently be more direct than the associate Justices. However, all Jus-
tices can influence their colleagues by rational persuasion, by cordial
welcome for all new members, by favorable comments on others' work,
by common courtesy, and by compromise and mutual accommodation
on occasion. The most precious instrument of influence is a Justice's
vote and threat of dissent. Bargaining, done tenderly as not to antago-
nize, becomes a crucial social skill. Murphy concludes that a socially
skillful Justice cannot create a bloc but that adept use of social skills
can be utilized to reinforce ideological affinities that already exist.
Sidney Ulmer has contributed some valuable insights into the role
of precedent in judicial decisions in his study of the Supreme Court's
history of overruling its own precedents. 8 Looking at the Court's his-
tory through fairly traditional research devices, Ulmer explored a
number of propositions relating to the Supreme Court's overruling it-
self. He found that the Court has only overruled specifically-in con-
trast to distinguishing or ignoring precedent-in cases where a majority
agreed. Commerce and taxation precedents have been most often over-
ruled, and overruling has usually been done to emphasize a change
rather than as a final step in a long evolution. Mathematically the cases
overruled had neither any correlation with the number of opportunities
to overrule, nor with the party affiliations of Justices. Apparently, the
most crucial factor was the appointment of many new members to the
Court within a short time. Thus, the changing composition of the
80. Murphy, Marshaling the Court: Leadershp, Bargaining, and the Judicial Process, 29 U.
Cm. L.R. 640 (1962).
81. Ulmer, An Empirical Analysis of Selected Aspects of Lawmaking of the United States
Supreme Court, 8 J. PuB. L. 414 (1959).
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judge's decision-making group may well influence his own perceptions
of adhering to or deviating from precedent.
Some work on the federal courts of appeal by Sheldon Goldman
indicated that these techniques of analysis can be applied to smaller
appellate decision-making groups as well.82 Goldman studied the be-
havior of the eleven circuit courts of appeal in search of some funda-
mental generalizations. He found that liberal and conservative blocs
generally do exist on these lower appellate benches as well. Party affili-
ation was found to be most closely related to voting behavior, espe-
cially in cases involving economic liberalism. Other variables, such as
social-economic origin and standing, education, and age, were not
found to be significantly related to voting behavior. While the article's
scope is not broad, it does serve to initiate some understanding of the
role which collegial decision-making plays in the intermediate federal
courts of appeal.
Llewellyn rested his argument that collegiate activity affects judi-
cial decision-making upon a point subsequently well explored in the
political science literature. As Charles H. Sheldon has indicated, "the
basic assumption underlying micro-group models is that when men
(judges) get together into some structured situation (collegial court),
their behavior is altered."83 This literature demonstrates the validity of
Llewellyn's thesis that collegial decision-making can alter what the sol-
itary judge might decide. However, this still is no guarantee that in any
given situation that bloc will not decide to play a strong policymaker
rather than law interpreter role. Yet clearly Llewellyn is correct in
pointing to the influence of consensual decision-making as a restraint
upon individual judicial values.
C. A Known Bench
A third important factor suggested by Llewellyn is that of a known
bench. 84 By this term Llewellyn meant that over a period of time the
performance of an appellate court-and its constituent members--can
be studied by lawyers and that they can discover the ways a particular
bench has looked at issues, how it has handled precedents, and most
importantly its attitudes. As Llewellyn put it, opinions "cumulate to
82. Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts ofAppeals, 1961-1964, 60 AM.
POL. Scr. REV. 374 (1966).
83. C. SHELDON, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL PROCESS: MODELS & APPROACHES 51 (1974).
84. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 5, at 34.
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show ways of looking at things, ways of sizing things up, ways of han-
dling authorities, attitudes in one area of life-conflict and another."85
As a result, lawyers can ascertain the kind of attitudes likely to be man-
ifested by the various members of the court and can be prepared to deal
with these judicial value positions prior to arguing their cases. In other
words, judges are restrained by their past behavior which manifests a
particular set of values. Attorneys do not have to face a court without
any idea of the range of attitudes and orientations they will encounter.
The judge limits himself by the past legacy of attitudes he has mani-
fested. This type of "attitudinal analysis" has been significantly under-
taken by political scientists. The objective in this kind of study is both
to understand the common values that act as a cohesive force holding
blocs together and to become aware of the differences in values mani-
fested within individual blocs. An important dimension for Llewellyn
is thus the consistency of judicial attitudes.
One example of this method of analysis is found in an article by
Harold Spaeth. 6 His goal was to identify "ideational identity" be-
tween members of the Supreme Court from 1953 to 1958. The bloc
used for analysis was that of Justices Black and Douglas. The analysis
focuses on both the extent of voting agreement and the character of the
issues which divided the usually highly cohesive pair. Through vote
analysis Spaeth demonstrated certain variations between the pair even
though they had a high overall index of agreement. For example,
Douglas was more intense in his civil liberty feelings and more inclined
to dissent than was Black. In suits between private taxpayers and the
government, Black almost uniformly voted for the government, while
Douglas supported the taxpayer. Black was more states'-rights ori-
ented than was Douglas, while Douglas was more judicially active than
was Black. In comparison with the more traditional case analysis, this
vote counting method allows more accurate and discriminating com-
parison of a pair of Justices than could be attained by simply indicating
the high levels of agreement between them.
Another attitudinal study by Spaeth used more sophisticated tech-
niques which go beyond the mere identification of a single important
variable.87 Various studies-many of which have been discussed in
85. Id.
86. Spaeth, An Approach to the Study of AttitudinalDifferences as an Aspect of Judcial Beha -
ior, 5 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 165 (1961).
87. Spaeth, Judicial Power as a Variable Motivating Supreme Court Behavior, 6 MIDWEST J.
POL. Sci. 54 (1962).
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this essay-have identified crucial factors influencing judicial votes,
such as attitudes about civil liberties, economic liberalism, federalism
and, the court's supervisory capacity over lower courts. Spaeth investi-
gated those case decisions in which such value-laden choices are not
offered to see if a particular single factor can explain these remaining
decisions. He suggested that views toward judicial activism/self-re-
straint could be such a variable, and he chose cases dealing with com-
ity, civil procedure, diversity of citizenship, and venue as representing
these value-free choices. Generally he found a strong correlation, and
he explained apparent contradictions by using sub-category analysis to
indicate that a particular Justice had-for varied reasons-a personally
strong interest in a certain category of otherwise value-free choices.
The next step beyond single variable attitudinal analysis has been
taken by Glendon Schubert.88 He proposes a multitudinal model, com-
bining into one framework a number of distinct values indentified by
scaling. Instead of a hypothesis that argues judges act in civil liberties
cases because of single variable, attitude toward civil liberties, Schubert
in effect combines five or six scales (view toward judicial power; atti-
tude toward the federal government, for example) into one three-di-
mensional ("five-dimensional factor space") model to delineate a
distinctive configuration of attitudinal outlooks for a particular judge.8 9
Hence Schubert's model recognizes, and seeks to remedy, one basic
fault of cumulative scaling-its uni-dimensionality. The judicial mind
when faced with a civil liberties case does not automatically exclude
the rest of the individual's experiences and values (a possible strong
preference for judicial restraint, for example), though these attutides
may play subordinate roles. Schubert's model recognizes this and re-
flects the interplay among and between a range of attitudes that occurs
in an individual judge's mind.
A further variation on attitudinal analysis is demonstrated in an-
other article by the prolific Schubert.90 Rather that relating pairs and
blocs of Justices to one another, this study utilizes recent methodologi-
cal innovations to produce an extensive study of the judicial philosophy
of a single justice. Schubert, in part, was seeking to disprove criticism
88. Schubert, The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A PsychologicalAnalysis, 56 AM. POLITI-
CAL ScI. REv. 90 (1962).
89. See also Schubert, Judicial 4ttitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term of the United
States Supreme Court, 28 L.R. CONTEMP. PROB. 100, 119-32 (1963).
90. Schubert, Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis, 59 AM. POLIT-
ICAL SCL REV. 940 (1965).
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that such techniques cannot deal in detailed value analysis as the more
traditional methods of judicial biography and case analysis. But Schu-
bert argues that his techniques are better than the traditional methods
because they manifest computer-precise data recall, permit simultane-
ous study of all opinions, and result in consistent evaluation of all data.
Using some esoteric methods, Schubert proceeds to test a number of
hypotheses about Jackson's philosophy, proving some, disproving
most. The methodology is based upon some thirteen content variables
subject to a variety of mathematical operations. In his conclusion,
Schubert is able to suggest some interesting distinctions between Jack-
son's overall voting behavior as contrasted with his written opinions.
It is clearly possible to determine the value orientation of judges
toward a variety of issues by use of political science techniques. It is
also obvious that there is some measure of persistence in these value
orientations. These observations, however, only render Llewellyn's ci-
tation of value preference as a "steadying factor" more puzzling. The
gist of his remarks seems to be that, while values do affect decisions, a
properly prepared attorney who must confront appellate judges can as-
certain these value preferences and prepare his arguments to meet
them. Further, because these attitudes are persistent through time, the
judge in effect has limited himself by his past behavior. The argument
that this is a "restraint" overlooks several important points. First, the
attorney will have to modify his presentation to comport with a partic-
ular court's legacy of past attitudes. Second, value performance is only
a restraint as long as the judge chooses to adhere to particular attitudes,
and he may very well shift his value orientation. Of all Llewellyn's
steadying factors, this one most effectively indicates his dual approach
to the issue of appellate decision-making. As a realist, Llewellyn con-
ceived of the judicial process as being rent with discretion and flex-
ibility. At the same time, he believed that there are some meaningful
restraints (including the judge's own attitudes) which, while not as
binding or constraining as logical determinism, still bring a measure of
limitation to appellate decision-making. The issue remains, however,
how much any given decision reflects value preferences rather than
steadying factors. That the two are present does not excuse judges from
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D. Some Other Steadying Factors
To conclude this examination of Llewellyn's theses, a number of
the remaining steadying factors will be lumped into one category.
These points as identified by Llewellyn are (1) law-conditioned offi-
cials9 (2) legal doctrine92 (3) known doctrinal techniques93 (4) issues
limited, sharpened, phrased94 and (5) adversary argument by counsel.95
In total, these points seem to all relate to the fact that a judge is "social-
ized" by his past training and experiences as a lawyer (and previous
judicial service, if any) to deal with legal issues in a particular technical
fashion. Socialization involves the setting of ones individual behavior
patterns, and the appreciation of the values of institutional roles.96 Key
steps in the judge's socialization process include law school, practice,
interaction with others in the legal system, and bar association activi-
ties. Interestingly enough, the socialization process can continue after
he assumes judicial office as well. For a federal judge, such factors as
his colleagues on the bench, seminars,97 judicial council activity, sup-
portive staff (particularly law clerks), and local lawyers, all tend to rein-
force the new judge's technical socialization. These factors also relate
to his role conception.98 As a result, the judge experiences constant
reinforcement of his past training which emphasized a technical ap-
proach to legal issues. Certainly this is not the only factor that influ-
ences his decision-making, but undoubtedly years of past training and
experience--constantly reinforced--exercise some influence upon a
judge's handling of legal questions.
V. CONCLUSION
Karl Llewellyn's goal in writing The Common Law Tradition: De-
ciding Appeals was to restore some balance to the examination of ap-
pellate decision-making. Clearly, Llewellyn had not abandoned his
realist orientation toward judicial policymaking, for to say that judges
have discretion and flexibility is not to state that there are no restraints
91. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 5, at 18.
92. Id. at 20.
93. Id. at 21.
94. Id. at 29.
95. Id.
96. See generally R. DAWSON & K. BRawrrT, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION (1969).
97. Cook, The Socialization of New Federal Judges: Impact on District Court Business, 1971
WASH. U.L.Q. 253, 263-66.
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upon their decision-making patterns. To maintain that legal logic does
not absolutely control judges is not to assert that judges can freely ig-
nore their training and technical orientations. The examples of politi-
cal science literature discussed within this paper substantiate
Llewellyn's intuition of the effects of judicial role and collegial deci-
sion-making upon appellate judges. The literature on attitudes also
sustains his contention that it is possible to ascertain judicial attitudes
and that these attitudes do tend to remain stable over time. And
finally, the literature also supports Llewellyn's position that past legal
skills and socialization tend to play a role as well.
Generally, the modem social science approach manifested in judi-
cial behavior studies confirms many of the early theses of legal realism
on motivation of judicial decision-making. Although this paper has
been able to discuss only a fraction of the available literature, it seems
obvious that a substantial body of research findings now exists relating
to judicial decision-making that can be drawn upon by any who are
interested. The key problem which lies ahead is to develop more pre-
cise techniques so that it will be possible to evaluate the role which the
kind of restraining factors Llewellyn suggested may play in any given
decision or line of decisions. Llewellyn's intuitions about restraining
factors have been substantiated by the subsequent ample body of judi-
cial behavior research. It remains to be determined what weight any of
these factors may play, vis-a-vis simple judicial preference, in decision-
making. The weight of these factors may well vary, from judge to
judge, and perhaps even relative to the same judge in different situa-
tions. So the trail blazed by the realists is being followed and devel-
oped, and the restoration of balance argued for by Llewellyn is also
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